Eleven years of failed negotiations: Why there is no agreement?

So far, this blog has shown two hindrances to cooperation in the Nile basin: lack of trust because of colonial history and the view that considers mega-projects the only solution. From my past writings, it could seem that there are no endeavours from the sides to make a deal. Well, this is not the case. In this post, I will examine past negotiations focusing on why they failed.

The first step towards cooperation was the creation of the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999 (NBI). The role of this organisation is to create a platform for Nile countries to accomplish cooperative programs together. In early 2011 the initiative had a historical chance to drive collaboration through the creation of the construction of the Border dam at GERD's current location. The project would have meant that Egypt and Sudan had contributed to the mega-project in return for its hydroelectrical benefits. However, the prerequisite for the downstream countries was to write a Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA) that would give water rights to an independent agency, replacing Egypt's Hegemony. This was an excellent opportunity to make NBI an official shared water organisation with cooperative river management; however, Egypt was narrow-minded and refused to lose its privileges. 

As a result, Ethiopia started to plan their own mega-dam with higher capacity and without any control from outsiders, even the International Panel of Experts. The country's argument that no one can have a word about their water still hardens negotiations. In 2015, however, when the construction started, there was a chance for agreement between the three countries. The Declaration of Principles (DoP)  signing addressed some of the downstream countries' concerns. Although, it lacked technical details like allocation during dry years, which made further treaties impossible. The main problem here is that it is difficult to calculate the exact effect of construction and filling of GERD on downstream countries with the uncertain climate variation caused by climate change.

Signing the Dop: in 2015, it seemed that tensions would ease and the declaration will the starting point of cooperation 

Since then, negotiations did not progress, only hostility and distrust. The core disagreement is that Ethiopia does not want to mitigate downstream shortages without corresponding obligations from them. There were several attempts by foreign countries and institutions to mediate reconciliation. The Trump administration's discussions in 2020 showed their limitations. As an ally of Egypt, the US tried to 'convince' Ethiopia by withdrawing $272 million in aid. This act did not help, moreover strengthened Ethiopia's view that upstream countries still rely on the influence of the West in water management.

In  April 2021, all communication stopped with the frozen AU-based negotiation. Simultaneously, Ethiopia finished the third stage of the filling holding 22 million cubic meter capacity from the planned 74. While Egyptian farmers are already complaining about water shortages. From the series of negotiations, it can be seen that major obstacles are the question marks around the dam's effects under extreme weather events and attempts to solve the issue through foreign powers instead of coordinated river treaties. More importantly, after GERD construction, participants see the conflict as a zero-sum game instead of pursuing win-win solutions of NBI.

A detailed timeline: 11 years of unsuccessful negotiations. Is there a solution?