Politics of water resources

So far, this blog has shown two hindrances to cooperation in the Nile basin: lack of trust because of colonial history and the view that considers mega-projects the only solution. From my past writings, it could seem that there are no endeavours from the sides to make a deal. Well, this is not the case. In this post, I will examine past negotiations focusing on why they failed. The first step towards cooperation was the creation of  the Nile Basin Initiative  in 1999 (NBI). The role of this organisation is to create a platform for Nile countries to accomplish cooperative programs together. In early 2011 the initiative had a historical chance to drive collaboration through the creation of the construction of the Border dam at GERD's current location.  The project would have meant that Egypt and Sudan had contributed  to the mega-project in return for its hydroelectrical benefits. However, the prerequisite for the downstream countries was to write a Comprehensive Framework Agreement

Hoover Dam: one of the first examples of large water engineering projects considered a 'wonder solution' and national pride The dam construction will likely have fatal consequences for Egypt in terms of decreased sediment and water sources. However, the discourse of the project excludes the local effects of the megaproject, potentially because transboundary conflict and the  picture of water wars keep media consumers more entertained.   In my last blog, I showed that most Ethiopian people want the project's implementation. This is partly due to the nationalist rhetoric of the government that suggests GERD is the answer to  socioeconomic tensions in the country.  According to the government, the 6450 MW of electricity produced by the dam could potentially double the energy production, therefore, could induce   35-40% GDP growth in the following decades . Within its communication, the government often highlights that it will be a game-changer for both the economy and the peop